(From e-book Alberton, Montana: Anatomy of a Toxic Train Wreck)
“I think there was very little, has been, very little negative about the outcome….” – Scott Waldron, IC of the Alberton spill response.35
“So many things went wrong in Graniteville that it’s now a test case for emergency responders nationwide,” noted one report about the 2005 chlorine spill.34
Think of Beverly Ridenour pulling fistfuls of medications from her bag and slapping them on the aide’s table. “—this, this, and take these—and these, and these, and every night to take some again along with this! Nobody understands! I’ve never had to do that before!”69
As an example of a worst-case scenario, the Alberton derailment and mixed chemical spill offered many lessons, if generally unrecognized. Though hindsight is 20-20, it is nonetheless wise to look through this lens.
The Day of the Spill
*Preparation
Responding agencies, including hospitals, had never trained for a catastrophic chemical gas release on this scale. The local community had no mass evacuation plan. Though responders and the community generally understood that chlorine gas was dangerous, they were naïve about much of chlorine gas behavior and toxicity. Given that, a detailed analysis of the response would have been valuable for future preparation, both for locals and as a real-life example for other communities.
*Spill Location
A key error with many repercussions: MRL dispatch gave the wrong general location of the spill to 911, implying, through various updates, the spill was two to four miles east of the actual site.1
MRL dispatch failed to pinpoint the exact location of the spill until 5:10 am, an hour after the derailment; even then, they failed to inform emergency officials.53 But responders, especially IC and 911, also failed to extract the exact location from MRL.
Missoula 911 dispatchers were unfamiliar with the precise place names of the area, which overlapped two counties. Though incorrect, they originally believed they roughly knew the spill location; given contradictory information on locations, or new information, they subsequently failed to reconcile the data and verify on a map a more accurate location of the spill, or extract from MRL an exact location such as a mile marker. (The spill was pre-GPS.)
Missoula 911 sent emergency responders to a vague and wrong location, potentially affecting their exposure.1
Missoula 911 gave similar incorrect or inconsistent information about the spill location to residents calling in, potentially affecting their exposure during evacuation.1
Missoula 911 often gave contradictory directions or confusing information about the spill location to responders and residents, which prolonged communications and wasted valuable time for responders, residents and 911, which was inundated with calls.1
Ironically, and fortunately, as early responders arrived at the wrong location miles east of the spill, some were likely spared more serious exposure, as many didn’t respond with PPE.
The evacuation of Alberton was delayed because Alberton volunteers originally responded to Petty Creek. The gas had fully arrived in Alberton by the time the volunteers returned, about 50 minutes after the derailment.1
When Scott Waldron met the engineers at Petty Creek, he failed to get an exact location of the spill and pass on the information. In hindsight, he claimed it not important.
Three-and-a-half hours after the spill, a Missoula recon hazmat team finally pinpointed the derailment in the field; while en route, they still weren’t sure where the spill was, citing communication issues with MRL (and other responders).54
*Personal Protection Equipment
Despite believing the spill was nearby, and despite arriving at Petty Creek as the edge of the gas cloud arrived, many responders, such as the deputies, had no PPE. Others with PPE didn’t have it on as they approached downwind and arrived in the area. Yet, responders also didn’t know how much chlorine had spilled or continued to leak, how much gas was headed their way or what other chemicals may have spilled.
If the spill had been nearby as believed, unprotected responders would have been at much greater risk.
The deputies worked the evacuation east of Petty Creek over the course of hours without PPE. Though PPE was available immediately via Frenchtown Fire, no responders brought the deputies PPE, or, if SCBA training was necessary, no trained responders relieved them. The sheriff’s office didn’t request such help either.
The Alberton Fire responders evacuating from Plateau Road to Alberton, where the gas was thicker, had limited, faulty or no PPE. This was partly due to poor equipment maintained by the Alberton Volunteer Fire Department (and presumably poor funding), and partly because IC Waldron sent some Frenchtown volunteers to help without PPE.55
Responders stationed at many roadblocks that received gas on April 11 had no or wore no PPE.
Late that afternoon, escorted by MRFD personnel, the news media was allowed to view the site from across the river on I-90 without PPE. MRL’s chlorine experts advised it was safe for reporters to view the site from across the river.36 This viewing site was within the broad Hot Zone, and in the days to come, the gas, often unpredictably and at high levels, drifted north across I-90.
After April 11, many people at the site were observed at times with improper or no respiratory protection, and a few people suffered inhalation injury.
*Gas Behavior
Responders generally understood chlorine gas to sink and dilute over distance, but this gas exhibited many behaviors. The original flash burst, which was apparently not understood, sent a gas cloud high and broad into the air, which seemed to linger as a cloud; subsequent spilled chlorine that converted to gas sunk and moved low down stream, but some gas also converted to HCl and HOCl and expanded higher and moved up the valley while nudged by the prevailing air movement. While the gas generally diluted with distance, it also moved in concentrated pockets, and pooled in geographic/atmospheric eddies in places; pockets of HCl and HOCl also had the capability to reconstitute some pure chlorine gas.
While responders didn’t fully understand the potential and actual behavior of the gas cloud, and generally didn’t have chlorine meters to help guide them, 911 gave confusing updates on the movement of the gas cloud, in part because of unfamiliarity with geographical locations and the original confusion over the spill location.
Absent chlorine meters, many responders used their nose and self symptoms to help guide them in determining risk.
Though responders could smell the gas at Petty Creek early on April 11, Waldron decided on nearby Fire Station 5 half a mile away as a Command Post, underestimating the gas movement; that command post, with no escape outlet except back toward the spill, was overrun by gas soon after and relocated to the Ninemile exit.1
Missoula responders in general had no idea, and later that day didn’t believe, that the gas cloud had also gone west, despite knowledge of this by Superior County responders, but also by Dave Ball of the Missoula Sheriff’s office from talking to the Superior sheriff, and from Missoula 911 via communication from an ambulance that encountered the gas at Fish Creek.1
*Controlling Initial Access
There was a slow response to close I-90 after the 4:07 am spill—4:46 am at the Wye, 4:58 am at Fish Creek—allowing more interstate drivers through. In between these locations, the first inner roadblocks occurred at Petty Creek and Ninemile soon after 4:45 am. Not knowing the true spill location, responders set up no roadblock at Exit 75, the closest interstate access near the spill site.1
*Evacuation
People close to the spill needed to act immediately after the derailment, preferably evacuating in a sealed vehicle, or remaining in a sealed structure, to have any hope of avoiding a possible severe exposure. Anyone in a home not completely sealed likely needed evacuation in areas that received gas.
Deputy Willis Hintz informed 911 by 4:30 am that evacuations would be necessary, but at that time the spill was believed to be near Petty Creek. By the time fire and law responders converged at Petty Creek, it was 4:45 am.1 An unnecessary delay occurred in evacuating Alberton when volunteers mustered at Petty Creek because of bad information. But evacuation was a slow process regardless, door-to-door in a semi-rural area. It took hours for these areas to be completely checked, and exposures by residents were inevitable. By necessity, the initial evacuations were not preventative, but a rescue operation. But this was all the more reason to add more protected responders to the effort, which wasn’t done. Meanwhile, nobody knew what was happening at the site, how much more chlorine might be coming or what other chemicals were involved, so outlying areas needed to be timely warned of potential evacuation, while, ideally, being monitored for at least chlorine.
There was no Reverse 911 call system to help quickly notify residents. The Alberton siren served as a general alert for a while for nearby areas, and then neighbors calling neighbors and door-to-door evacuations or street patrols led to evacuations over a few hours. But even Reverse 911 wouldn’t eliminate the need for responders to check each house.
Many residents, even in Alberton, didn’t understand the severity of the threat and lingered in evacuating. A few households, including those with minors, refused to evacuate and stayed behind.
Previous weather caused flooding and mud bogs of unpaved roads that made evacuation difficult or impossible in certain directions, while areas like Ponde Rosa Acres and Plateau Road had only one egress route; many bottle-necked residents had to evacuate toward the gas cloud.
There was a lack of clear evacuation information given to 911 and EOC, who needed to inform the calling public and media what areas were being evacuated. Because of the confusion over the spill location and behavior of the gas cloud, 911 was at times confused in telling callers which way to evacuate. For hours, 911 and EOC seemed in the dark on evacuation parameters as residents called for information.
Alberton responders wasted time trying to locate an elderly man who needed help in evacuating, because the address given by 911 was incorrect; 911 would not give the person’s name, which local responders said they would have recognized and located.1
No word came from any agency to evacuate west of the spill, besides Plateau Road and Reardon Lane, despite knowledge by 911 and some responders that the gas had moved west as far as Fish Creek by 4:58 am. The Missoula Rural FD made a call to evacuate from the Natural Pier Bridge to Ninemile Bridge at 5:17 am. Sometime after 7:45 am MRFD logged that the evacuation went as far west as the Cyr Bridge.1,54
But on the west end, the Sawmill Gulch/Cyr area was not evacuated, though it lay in the Exclusion Zone and residents were exposed. This appeared to be a decision made by the Sheriff of Mineral County, probably based on the belief that the bulk of the gas was headed east, and a poor understanding of the potential behavior for more gas to sink and move downstream, even in the days to come.
Other evacuations were belated on April 11. Sergeant Dave Ball reported complaints from residents of the West Fork of Petty Creek beginning before 9:00 am. “They are advising that their noses and eyes are watering, running, and they are saying they must get out.”1 No one called for evacuating the West Fork of Petty Creek until 4:00 pm. Evacuation from the West Fork was problematic, in that egress to the south was blocked by an impassable road, and egress to the north meant driving toward a potentially thicker gas cloud.
Beyond the initial evacuation zone, evacuations were behind the curve, officials not anticipating movement of the gas, especially in the area beyond the mouth of Ninemile.
The so-called precautionary evacuation of areas east of Ninemile came long after significant gas arrived; based on reports of gas smelled and symptoms at least as far as the Huson area, these areas should have been evacuated much earlier and not just as a precaution; these outlying areas weren’t even officially warned early that they might need to evacuate, which could have served as a true precaution action.
Responders began complaining of smells and symptoms in the Huson area by 6:23 am, and began advising evacuation at least to Huson. Some area residents thought they smelled gas as early as around 5:30 am. Many people said they smelled the gas as far as Frenchtown. Only just before 10:00 am, after three-and-a-half hours of responder- and resident-logged complaints of smells and symptoms, did officials begin evacuating areas east of the Ninemile evacuation zone border as far as Huson. The first logged calls for monitoring in the Huson area came at 10:50 am, reflecting a lack of monitors and monitoring confirmation. Ironically, this evacuation was later called only ‘precautionary.’ Residents east of Ninemile as far as 14 road miles from the spill reported a range of symptoms, including burning and watering eyes, burning skin, blisters in the nose, bleeding gums and noses, headache, burning lungs, sore throat, coughing, difficulty breathing and the triggering of asthma attacks in asthmatics—and later, chronic illness.1
Ideally, east of the evacuation zone, monitors should have been set up, but few were available. At the least, evacuation warnings should have been issued in advance. East of Ninemile, a true precautionary or preventative evacuation could have been called for soon after general evacuations began.
At Frenchtown High School, during an hours-long wait, evacuees complained about lack of information and felt no one was in control, other than EMTs and volunteer firemen (the Missoula County Sheriff was reportedly in a vehicle outside the building). Evacuees said no one spoke to them about their health concerns or offered decontamination.
*Communications
The Red Cross was not informed of the spill and response until they called Missoula 911 at 4:59 am.1
Missoula 911 informed area hospitals at 5:02 am, but only regarding the engineers, not the potential for mass casualties, which began coming in around 5:15 am.1
The MEANS alert (itself vague on evacuations and which incorrectly cited Petty Creek as the spill area) wasn’t activated by agencies until 5:28 am, an hour and twenty-one minutes after the spill.1 Without a MEANS alert, the media had not been officially advised yet about the emergency, and in turn could not inform the public about evacuations and potential exposures.
One radio station called 911 around 5:50 am seeking basic information, not having received the belated MEANS alert. 911 was still inundated. Over one hundred minutes after the spill, the broadcast media was not being effectively used as a conduit to inform the public and take pressure off 911. Bill Silverman of DES told 911 “we’re working on getting an information officer.” MRFD’s Bill Reed became the Public Information Officer to handle media calls only at about 7:30 am.1
Hours after the spill, 911 was still the source of information for callers about the gas cloud and evacuation, and yet 911 often had poor and dated information, and was swamped.
It took two-and-a-half hours for an emergency information number to be established and disseminated, during which the beleaguered 911 and DES didn’t have full evacuation information to give callers. Until then, information about evacuations and the spill had been poor, inaccurate, and a guessing game—largely because IC was not updating 911 and DES.
By default, 911 was a de facto clearinghouse for new information, such as on the site location, gas movement, and on where people smelled gas and reported symptoms—but 911 dispatchers didn’t effectively share information even among themselves. No one oversaw new information to pass on coherently among dispatchers as a unit.
Likewise, while 911 dispensed inaccurate information both to responders and evacuees, responders on the ground failed to correct 911 even as they gained new information such as the spill location and gas behavior.
Missoula 911 was understaffed and beleaguered—they needed help, guidance and better information. Extra workers didn’t begin to arrive until 5:30 am and later. When more dispatchers arrived at 911 to help, they weren’t fully informed before taking calls. One new dispatcher, already taking a call, didn’t know there was a chlorine spill.1
The spill occurred in one county but heavily impacted a second county, the former having much less resources; this transboundary issue complicated communications, and therefore response and evacuations.
There were both technical communication problems and jurisdictional communication issues, the latter brought on by attitudes of agency independence, such as by Frenchtown Fire. Law enforcement and fire responders, in general, shared little communication. Missoula Rural Hazmat and MRL appeared to share little communication in the first few hours, and yet both were independently responding to the spill site.56-58
*Decontamination
On April 11, there was a lack of decontamination procedure at the Ninemile FO, Frenchtown High School evacuation center and Missoula area hospitals for residents and for responders. This resulted in potential cross contamination as well. Emergency medical providers in Missoula inexplicably omitted this basic protocol; at least on this day, the fire response didn’t take it seriously either.
*Gas Toxicity
Missoula 911 and others didn’t understand the severity of chlorine toxicity.
Dale Golden said 911 accessed the DOT handbook and looked up chlorine, as well as received advice from Dr. Warren Guffin, 911’s only apparent sources for medical information on chlorine.37 The DOT handbook said for chemicals like chlorine: “TOXIC; may be fatal if inhaled or absorbed through skin” and “Contact with gas or liquefied gas may cause burns, severe injury.”2
Yet Missoula 911 never advised that chlorine was a toxic gas, potentially life threatening. They advised chlorine was “just an irritant…. It’s not a poison.”1
911’s other source of chlorine information came from Dr. Guffin out of St. Patrick’s Hospital Emergency Room, who implied that chlorine was not “something terribly toxic” requiring medical aid beyond removal from the scene. He also said, “It’s not something that has an antidote. It’s basically an irritant only,” and told a Missoula ambulance crew and 911 that for most of the evacuees no treatment would be necessary or helpful.1 Guffin had no idea how much chlorine had spilled and what people’s exposures were, or whether other chemicals were involved. Rather than prepare for mass casualties, Guffin effectively was steering most evacuees away from the hospital.
Missoula 911 also sometimes didn’t reveal or hesitated to reveal what had spilled to resident callers.1
Responders without PPE believed that they could avoid serious exposure based on how they felt, in effect, using themselves as monitors. Responders without PPE didn’t understand the accumulative effect of long exposure to low concentrations of chlorine.
IC Waldron and other supervisors didn’t recognize a need to either bring in more PPE or replace unprotected responders with responders with PPE.
The 17-Day Evacuation
*Jurisdictional Friction
Missoula Rural Hazmat complained that MRL was poor at communication with them on day one, and MRL was already on scene at the spill site even as the Missoula recon team responded without being told the location of the site.56,57,59 In the aftermath of the spill, MRL initially sought operational control at the site, and then agreed to become part of Unified Command, but set up a highly unusual parallel command structure under the Incident Command System in which they controlled the site.
During the next few days, IC Waldron and MRL obstructed the EPA from access to the site until Day Four when EPA replacements arrived. The main reason given was ‘safety’ concerns, despite that the EPA was hazmat certified and in fact instructed nationally on hazmat safety and operations.60 The EPA, experienced at responding to toxic spills and with jurisdiction to oversee hazmat response at a Superfund incident, was initially marginalized and spoon-fed information, potentially compromising an effective and efficient response. As a later consequence, some residents became suspicious of the EPA shutout, wondering what officials and/or MRL might have been hiding during those early days.
Behind the scenes, high-level state and local responders cited a desire to maintain local control of the incident, in a turf war over operational control. But the real issue of control appeared to lie with MRL, as state officials later alleged the EPA shut out came at the behest of MRL’s owner Dennis Washington and Montana Governor Marc Racicot, out of Washington’s concern of maintaining control over costs.46 Whether MRL somehow saved money was unclear, as the EPA typically dictated expenditures only when the responsible party was unwilling. The net practical effect was that MRL maintained substantial control of the site until Day Four when a new EPA OSC came on board. To an outside observer, MRL appeared to have bought time.
Arguably, the most valuable object at the site was the failed rail.
*Sawmill Gulch/Cyr Evacuations
This area fell within the Exclusion Zone but was not evacuated until April 15, despite ongoing complaints by some residents and roadblock personnel. The original decision to not evacuate appeared to lie with the Mineral County Sheriff’s Office, which oversaw the west end of the zone. Shirley Anderson of Sawmill Gulch Road said that she called the Mineral County Sheriff’s office on April 11 to ask about evacuation of Sawmill. “And they said no…they weren’t evacuating that area.”3 As residents’ concern grew by April 14, Sheriff O’Brien gave an order not to evacuate, further dispelling notions that the area had somehow been overlooked. There was a conscious decision on the part of Mineral County not to evacuate.61
But logs indicated that Incident Command, the Tech Group, and Missoula Rural Hazmat, at the least, knew about this as well, beginning with hazmat/IC responding to Cyr complaints late on April 11.54,62
Ultimately, no one took public responsibility for what was called an oversight.
*Visits by Residents to the Exclusion Zone
After a test run on April 12 for logistics, officials decided to let residents return for visits in the Exclusion Zone to retrieve animals and possessions and to feed pets and livestock permanently left behind. These visits were then repeated about three times a week, during early morning hours under conditions of no work disturbing the spill site. Monitoring was limited, at least during the first few days of visits, as monitors were in short supply. People were either escorted in, generally in car caravans, or bussed in groups, though some came on their own.
Though officials deemed these visits safe, many residents complained of chemical odors and concomitant symptoms, including reports of a pesticide smell and white powder in the area. Additionally, officials soon recognized that gas releases often occurred spontaneously. Despite these red flags, officials allowed the visits to continue, with limited monitoring.
Several people not originally evacuated reported their first exposure during these visits, which caused both acute and chronic injury. Residents who visited and had complaints, especially symptoms during visits, became distrustful of safety assurances.
These complaints also generated concern about and an investigation into whether the spilled potassium cresylate had reacted with the chlorine to create chlorinated compounds. Even while this concern was yet unresolved, officials allowed visits to continue.
Soil and wipe tests eventually determined that no chlorinated compounds migrated very far from the site, and officials claimed any refugee chlorine gas was negligible during visits. Officials never accounted for the ongoing complaints of odors and symptoms during visits; there were no systematic air tests conducted during these visits, other than limited chlorine monitoring.
Missoula health department director and co-Incident Commander Ellen Leahy claimed later not to recall that any visits were allowed after April 13.44
*Responder Exposure in the Exclusion Zone
Chlorine gas periodically released at the site throughout the 17-day evacuation, creating intensely hazardous conditions at the site and at times a diluted but toxic gas well beyond.
Some firemen stationed at Station 5 near Petty Creek complained of ongoing exposures that sent them to the ER. Some roadblock personnel at Petty Creek complained of new exposures and symptoms.
On one occasion, the Cyr roadblock moved back permanently a few miles because of irritating gas.63 On another, Forward Ops at the Natural Pier Bridge briefly evacuated because of a pulse of chlorine gas. In both cases, it appeared people were exposed to levels of at least 2.5 ppm, despite monitoring set up as a warning system.64,65
These exposures weren’t publicized.
*Resident Exposure Outside the Exclusion Zone
During the periods of chlorine pulses, some residents outside the Exclusion Zone, including on Ponde Rosa Acres after the zone was reduced to Petty Creek April 14, complained of new exposures.
Sawmill Gulch/Cyr lay inside the Exclusion Zone but was not evacuated until early April 15, after days of periodic complaints of exposure from residents and also the roadblock crew.
*Early Re-exposure Warnings
When the area east of Petty Creek was opened for reentry by residents on April 14, and later in preparation for general reentry, the Missoula health department released handouts warning of the possibility that residual pockets of chlorine gas may remain in low areas and poorly ventilated areas such as basements, and that residual HCl may coat surfaces. If any chlorine odor was present but not strong, residents were instructed to open windows and doors to air out homes. If chlorine odors were strong or irritated the skin, eyes, nose or throat, residents were to contact Frenchtown Rural Fire for assistance. Regardless of the likelihood of a residual exposure, this protocol of having previously exposed residents doing chemical safety checks on their homes put residents at risk of further exposure, especially those with ongoing illness and sensitivity.66
The April 14 handout advice was also done in complete ignorance by health officials of the potassium cresylate spilled and prior to the yet unknown concern over whether chlorinated compounds had formed and migrated.
No such handout was prepared for the April 13 animal rescue visits.
*Pets and Livestock
Officials believed it was safe to continue to leave livestock behind, including in the broad Hot Zone, despite the “potential for significant releases of chlorine” that warranted “extreme caution” for humans.4 Officials debated the issue at times, but made no changes. Leaving animals behind also meant that residents were regularly allowed back into the Exclusion Zone to tend to them, and that hazmat personnel must tend to those in the Hot Zone, putting people at unnecessary risk to exposure. While people spent limited time tending to animals, and hazmat personnel wore PPE, animals lived in the area 24/7. Varying by their location, animals were unnecessarily exposed to more chlorine and possibly other chemicals.
*Behavior of Chlorine Gas in a Ruptured Tank
Responders faced a very difficult and dangerous task of trying to patch the ruptured tank and unload the remaining liquid chlorine, which went through a freeze and thaw cycle in the tank and the surrounding soil. Gas releases were especially troublesome at night, with less dispersal than during the day, and during rainstorms any time of day. Wind shifts could, and did, drive a high level of chlorine toward site personnel abruptly.
Despite these conditions, at least in the initial days after the spill, some MRL personnel or contractors were observed without PPE protection at the site.
Even with later oversight by the EPA and better PPE protection, a few workers suffered exposure and injury. Marine Environmental continued to observe poor protection practices.38
*The Tank Rupture
Because of the location, size and shape of the tank rupture, responders had a very difficult time attaching a good patch and seal on the leaky tank, making transfer difficult, and liquid transfer impossible, which extended the evacuation period and the transportation corridor closures, while increasing the risk of exposures to workers. Meanwhile, movement of the tank, disturbance of adjacent soil, heating of the tank during transfer and rainy weather contributed to periodic pulses of high concentration chlorine releases.
*Censure at Public Meetings
The inconsistent protocol at evacuee meetings regarding open questions ultimately served to stifle information sharing and create resentment and suspicion among many residents. Residents and responders benefited from sharing information, and the shutting down of open discussion and segregating of questions into individual or small group sessions suppressed information sharing and understanding.
Furthermore, residents were a source of key information regarding reports of a pesticide smell during visits, symptoms during visits, and of a white residual powder. Residents’ complaints informed investigations.
*Chemical Sensitization
Spill victims’ sensitization following their exposures was a key issue, and the official approach prior to reentry was crucial, as it set the tone for how government agencies, the medical community, the media, lawyers, and spill victims as well would view the issue.
Despite their later assurances of having understood and publicly addressed sensitization, the EPA and the Missoula health department, the initial leaders in the public discussion on health matters, seemed caught off guard by the issue and limited in their response.
Examples include the belated warnings about sensitivity to chlorinated pools during evacuees’ stay in Missoula, coming after the fact of exposure and complaints of symptoms after swimming. Officials also allowed residents to visit the Exclusion Zone during the 17-day evacuation without warning of potential sensitivity reactions, including respiratory reactions. But as the issue finally gained some traction during evacuee meetings and behind the scenes in health-related meetings, officials failed to elaborate publicly on the potential symptoms and promised a short duration for symptoms of six to eight weeks for anyone with sensitivity.67,68 They failed to sufficiently warn residents prior to general reentry that they might suffer sensitivity to the Alberton environment and their homes, despite the red flags of complaints by residents during visits. They failed to clearly state that victims might suffer multiple chemical sensitivity in general, and no one said the illness might be permanent (possibilities established in the medical literature). The information given about chemical sensitivity was extremely understated. Subsequently, the media barely mentioned the issue and residents later said many doctors failed to recognize the syndrome or relate sensitivity symptoms to the Alberton exposure.
Officials failed to have an environmental doctor make a public presentation to residents on sensitivity, which would have allowed a frank and illuminating discussion on the issue of sensitization and informed residents on what they may face long-term and how to treat or adapt. This openness also would have given spill victims suffering from sensitivity better credibility in their community. This information additionally would have given residents leverage in any debate about the safety of returning home.
*The Contaminated Soil
While Ellen Leahy’s consensus team of various officials and medical professionals believed the highly odorous contaminated soil should be removed from the site prior to reentry by residents, the EPA’s Steve Way believed the soil posed no danger and was at most a nuisance odor issue.69,70 For residents sensitized to their exposures, however, any additional exposure to odors from the site produced further illness. The contaminated soil issue reflected failure by the EPA and health officials to recognize the risk and significance of chemical sensitization for residents.
After Reentry
*Sensitization to the Alberton Environment and Beyond
Once home, many residents reported continuing odors of chlorine and pesticide-like chemicals associated with the spill, both in the general area, including homes and yards, and at the site. While sensitized residents also could have become sensitive to various other triggers, the Alberton environment clearly made many returning residents feel much worse.
But health officials and the EPA declared the area safe for reentry and decided against considering sensitization as a reentry criterion. This left sensitized residents adrift. The ones who felt worse when they returned home were left to complain to the responsible party, MRL, who was mainly interested in having claimants sign off on any claims, not in substantiating sensitivity. The EPA, Montana DEQ, Montana DPHHS and the Missoula health department offered no meaningful recourse. Some spill victims who could not tolerate living in the area left and were given no help in relocating and no compensation for any economic loss in selling their home. Others remained behind and suffered worse symptoms.
Debilitation from sensitization also affected employment. Spill victims with long-term illness were left to negotiate with MRL for needed monetary compensation or begin the long and uncertain-outcome process of litigation. At the same time, because sensitization issues were so poorly emphasized and publicized by health officials and consequently the media, which affected public education and awareness on the issue, many medical providers in the Missoula area seemed skeptical of relating various symptoms to the spill exposure, further undermining residents’ claims against MRL. The issue of sensitization was so poorly defined as a consequence of the Alberton spill that it also affected how residents not suffering long-term illness viewed the credibility of those that did. Many sensitized residents felt their lives torn apart with no one to turn to for help.
Despite complaints from residents before and after removal of the soil, and the major spike of complaints during the 1997 spring thaw and First Anniversary of the spill, the issue of sensitization to the Alberton spill site and area, and the general issue of sensitization, would never be adequately addressed by local health officials and government agencies, nor publicized.
In sum, the Missoula health department conducted no investigation into post-soil removal complaints. MT DEQ failed to investigate or take seriously resident complaints about the spill site and general area, while recognizing corporate complaints made by Plum Creek and the Missoula Electric Cooperative.71-73 The EPA signed off on the site and failed to hold a public meeting to address complaints, until the EPA Ombudsman hearing of 2000, which was in large part a complaint against the EPA. The ombudsman’s investigation into Alberton was effectively ended by the dissolution of his office; the subsequent IGO report unconvincingly absolved the EPA of any shortcomings in regard to the safety of residents returning home and in regard to issuing warnings about chronic health effects.
*Chronic Illness
In the weeks, months and years after the spill, following the assurance from health officials that there generally should be no long-term health effects for the vast majority of spill victims, many victims discovered the reality of chronic illness from their exposures. Much of the illness related to chemical sensitivity, despite official assurance that any such sensitivity would be gone by eight weeks at most.
ATSDR’s Phase II Study determined that chronic eye and skin problems resulted from the Alberton spill.39 Ophthalmologist Dr. Rick Neumeister also documented chronic eye injury.74 While ATSDR found mixed results regarding chronic respiratory illness, Dr. Cynthia Lewis-Younger found new cases of RADS in a small sample and suggested other cases had gone undiagnosed, and recommended peak flow studies.75 (ATSDR hadn’t even conducted baseline pulmonary function tests.)
Of ATSDR study participants, more spill victims than controls self-reported chronic symptoms, and 43.8% felt more sensitive to chemicals after the spill (compared to 23.2% of controls). ATSDR failed to conduct a scientific sensitivity study.39
Participants were split into one-third reporting no concern that they were chronically harmed by the spill, one-third reporting a little concern and one-third reporting they were very concerned, suggesting two-thirds had mild to significant chronic symptoms.
ATSDR study participants also were much more likely to report neurological symptoms, though ATSDR failed to conduct neurological testing. Independently, Dr. Kaye Kilburn reported neurological damage to spill victims in his testing.76
From the lawsuit claims and my interviews, many spill victims reported chronic illness from their exposures.
The lesson here is self-evident. Many Alberton spill victims, not limited to those in close proximity of the spill, and originally exposed to at least chlorine, developed chronic illness, including injury to their skin, eyes and lungs, and an array of symptoms related to chemical sensitivity. Chemical sensitivity was never seriously investigated by any government health agency. Victims may also have suffered neurological damage, likewise never seriously investigated by any government health agency. All of this belies any notion that the vast majority had ‘complete recovery.’
Spill victims suffering chronic illness received little support from local, state or national agencies in their quest to document their chronic illness, document ongoing exposure, and receive medical help. They were left to their own devices to understand and prove individual chronic illness, often working with doctors that didn’t recognize environmental illness, in order to try and get compensation from MRL for medical costs and economic losses.
Compensated or not, many victims of the Alberton spill were left with chronic illness.
*Research Opportunities
Major chlorine spills are a relatively rare event, and time after time health studies offered the caveat that because of this, much was not known about the chronic effects of chlorine on human health. New information on chronic skin and eye effects did arise from the ATSDR-sponsored survey and study; Dr. Kilburn’s studies offered new information on neurological damage, though the studies were dismissed by local health officials and MRL as being litigation tainted; Dr. Neumeister’s eye injury cases went completely under the radar, except in court.
But ATSDR and any other health agency squandered the opportunity to study MCS and neurological damage from the spill, and county and state officials conducted no surveys to determine how many people had their health aggravated by returning home, or to see how many people permanently relocated as a result.
Another research opportunity lost: the affect of the spill on wildlife. Many residents mentioned a dearth of birds and insects following the spill, echoed nine years later in reports on the Graniteville spill: “The chlorine…gas harmed everything it touched. It hurt wiring in buildings, ruined anything electronic, and killed trees, plants, shrubbery, birds, and insects. For months, Graniteville was silent. There were no birds singing, no insects flying, and no fire ants crawling.”33 Many in the Alberton area reported a similar silence, left uninvestigated.
Nonprofessionals made an effort. Research into the spill contributed to the theses of three University of Montana graduate students. Photojournalism student Terry Stella documented evacuees at the Frenchtown High School, and environmental studies graduate students Hope Sieck and Lisa Mosca, respectively, wrote an analysis of the disclosures during the spill and made a video overview with an emphasis on spill victims’ plight.77,78 Maarten Schreuder, a University of Montana graduate student in biology, studied the effects of chlorine on local vegetation.79
The Media
The public perception in the Missoula area about the Alberton spill was fundamentally four-pronged:
1. Alberton was mainly a chlorine spill.
2. The vast majority of people exposed recovered quickly and completely.
3. A vocal minority had complaints of no real significance.
4. The derailment was an unavoidable accident.
Victims complained that media coverage was biased in emphasizing reports of fraud against MRL, claims of some evacuees taking petty advantage of MRL, and lawsuits, while de-emphasizing the health and safety concerns of many residents and their allegations of lack of full disclosure about what spilled. Many evacuees felt their concerns were underreported or ignored.
One caveat, understandably, is that chaos reigns in emergencies, and information can be sketchy and uncertain. Another is that the media can be given insufficient, misleading or false information to report upon. Ultimately, though, the media has been granted a gift in an open society—its nose, and the responsibility to follow it.
*Chlorine Estimates
Unlike AP reports, the Missoulian failed to initially publish the estimated volume of chlorine gas spilled on April 11, or the estimated size of any gas cloud. Original estimates from the state Department of Military Affairs were that 170,000 pounds might have spilled, which was published elsewhere.80 That amount—nearly a full tanker—was the basis for Dr. Fred Millar’s statement (corroborated by the Chlorine Institute) that 90 tons of chlorine could create a cloud 40 miles long.81,82 (The Missoulian later interviewed Millar, but omitted any mention of his gas cloud estimate.) A back page Missoulian report on the 12th did refer to one chlorine tank as having leaked “a railcar’s worth of liquid chlorine,” but this otherwise unquantified characterization was all but lost in the day’s reporting.5 Another story referred to “thousands of pounds of chlorine spilled.”6 Only on Day 8 did the Missoulian quantify an estimate, now updated, on how much chlorine had escaped on the day of the spill: 122,000 pounds.83
The omission of the volume of gas released may have just reflected poor reporting, with editorial blinders on regarding the accounts published outside of the Missoula area. But taken into account with the lack of information on the potential of a chlorine gas cloud size and range, these omissions made it appear there was a conscious choice not to inform the public of the magnitude of the event and the potential for greater exposure from any ongoing leak or additional tank rupture.
*Chlorine Exposures
There were no specific published reports on monitoring during the April 11 evacuation, or of estimates, to give an indication of what levels of chlorine were in the area. For Day 1, the only general report was a “very low” reading 600 yards from the site at an unspecified direction and point in time.7 There were also no published reports that anyone smelled chlorine beyond the evacuation zone.
It wasn’t until Day 5, after reporting that chlorine readings near and off-site were “mostly non-existent,” that the Missoulian first mentioned measurements in ‘parts per million.’8 Readers had no context on what were safe or lethal levels, on what levels produced symptoms, on what duration of exposure at a given level signified, or whether a given level affected individuals differently, such as healthy vs. asthmatic people. The public wasn’t informed that individuals could have symptoms of irritation at levels as low as 0.5 ppm. The public wasn’t told that the level considered Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) for chlorine exposure was 10 ppm. The day after general reentry, as cleanup continued at the site, the Missoulian wrote that an MRL employee reported that “the chlorine level at some times spiked to 0.5 parts-per-million, still acceptable to work in without protective gear, according to EPA standards.”9 This was the first published indication suggesting what safe levels might be, and it didn’t come from a health official source.
No published media report on Alberton ever connected known symptomatology or health risks to known or hypothetical exposure levels. A simple matter of publishing information off of the readily available Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for chlorine, or OSHA guidelines, would have provided the public some basic information, or simply accessing the agency expertise at hand.
The Missoulian failed to give a basic scientific context for chlorine exposures, or investigate what levels people may have been exposed to at any time during the spill and evacuation period. Residents and readers found no journalistic documentation of the levels people were or may have been exposed to.
Finally, reflecting the failure of emergency medical providers in Frenchtown and Missoula to provide decontamination, there was no published recommendation by any official or doctor associated with the spill that people exposed to the gas should change or launder clothes, bathe, bathe their pets, or decontaminate their vehicle, and the issue was never brought up by the media independently.
*Evacuations
There were never any published reports of residents outside of the evacuation zone smelling chlorine or other gasses or having symptoms, but a cursory look at emergency logs revealed that the cloud had impacts well beyond the evacuation zone.
In their Sawmill Gulch reporting published on April 15, in which the Missoulian unwittingly interviewed people left behind in the Exclusion Zone—as shown in the Missoulian’s own map insert—the newspaper failed to connect the dots.84
*Reach of the Chlorine Gas
The Missoulian reported on officials’ promise of supplying an air model of the original release, which purpose was to inform people on where the cloud had migrated and in what concentration. Officials eventually claimed such a model was impossible, and the subject of where the cloud went that day and how it behaved was never brought up in the media again, even later after models were available.
Scant mention was reported on vegetation damage. The only published word from an incident official concerning vegetation damage came on Day 1, with an assurance that there was no damage to be seen.85 The first report of site vegetation damage came from a stay-behind resident on Day 4.87 A few days later, chemist Garon Smith provided the first off-site insight: “fir trees within a mile of the derailment already have started to turn brown and yellow.”10 The next report came from a reporter’s observation of the site after reentry that some fir and pine trees looked “browned.”9
A later vegetation study and conifer bronzing map contracted by MRL, available in court records, was never publicized. This map showed that many areas well beyond the site were heavily damaged, including spots outside the Exclusion Zone, and by proximity, the map suggested that Alberton had been effectively ‘bronzed’ as well.86
*Potassium Cresylate
Confusion reigned initially in identifying the contents and volume spilled from the potassium cresylate tank. A Missoulian report on April 12 said that “corrosive liquid sodium hydrochloride (sic)” leaked, but “only slightly and very locally” from one of the cars.5 A separate report by the same reporter identified the car as sodium hydroxide, “a corrosive liquid that is used in industrial cleaning.”11 Chris Hohol of Superior Environmental Services made a published statement at the April 13 evacuee meeting that ‘chryslic (sic) sodium,’ a derivative of sodium hydroxide, was leaking in a “miniscule” amount. He also referred to this chemical and chlorine as mixing: “‘It made the cloud look worse, much worse than it actually was,’ said Hohol, about the mixture of the two chemicals.”12 At this point, no one, including the media, questioned what this mixing might mean.
The media didn’t report on the handling instructions for this tanker, which warned that the dangerous solution was toxic by ingestion, inhalation and skin absorption, and may cause extreme irritation. A self-contained breathing apparatus and skin protection were required in handling a spill.
The MSDS for potassium cresylate elaborated on the handling warnings, including the warning that inhalation could lead to death.13
The train consist and MSDS information was known by some officials and MRL on the day of the spill. None of this hazmat-related information on potassium cresylate was ever published.
Unpublished, MRFD estimated on the day of the spill that the entire tanker of potassium cresylate had spilled. One end of the tank was ruptured in a half circle from top to bottom, and the south ditch was either full of the cresylate or stained by it when responders reconned the area.88
It appeared that officials withheld from the media that they thought a whole tank of a caustic liquid had spilled.
Hohol’s April 13 report to evacuees that the potassium cresylate was leaking in a “miniscule” amount on the day after the spill was undoubtedly accurate. Little more could leak out of the massive rupture at the car’s angle.
By the 15th, the Missoulian reported that evacuees demanded to know more about what was in the ‘other’ car, the ‘chryslic sodium.’89 There was no inquiry by the paper to pursue this. Only on the 16th—the fifth day of reporting—was the term potassium cresylate used, though without mentioning its components besides sodium hydroxide.7
Spill victims weren’t told the components of potassium cresylate, or the handling warnings, or the health warnings concerning exposure, or that 17,000 gallons had spilled¾despite that all this information was known during the evacuation. Some of this information was withheld from the media, some was available. After general reentry, when reporters became aware of the amount of contaminated soil, the “several hundred yards of deep burgundy-colored potassium cresylate” stained soil, and the 1,935 total cubic yards of contaminated soil reported on June 15, there was no published accounting for the discrepancy with the reputedly small amount of cresylate earlier reported as spilled.9,19
Yet another interesting piece of information was also known on the day of the spill. The potassium cresylate car wasn’t just ‘nearby’ as reported in the early news, or ‘adjacent,’ as reported Day 12—its ruptured end was butted at an angle against the ruptured end of Tank 3. Some 130,000 pounds of liquid chlorine, some under pressure, vented as a gas and spilled as a boiling liquid into the path of 17,000 gallons of spilled potassium cresylate, under a drizzling rain. Officials didn’t convey this image and scenario to the public and the media, and the media never connected the dots as information came in. The significance of the scenario as a reactor for chlorinated compounds only came to the forefront as residents complained of odors and symptoms during visits to the area.
While Jamie Becker on Day Four said at an evacuee meeting that there hadn’t been disclosure concerning the potassium cresylate car, and as residents began complaining of odors and symptoms during visits—though the complaints weren’t published yet—on Day 7, without elaboration or apparent irony, the Missoulian report on the afternoon evacuee meeting said, “Many participants have used the [meetings] to voice their fears and speculation that information about the situation was being withheld.”14
Later when it was understood that a reaction had taken place between the cresylate and chlorine, the press said “dozens” of compounds had been created, but never elaborated beyond ‘chlorinated phenols,’ tri-chlorophenol and chloroform as having formed, which created more suspicions by residents of a cover-up.15 “It’s been three weeks, and they haven’t disclosed the unknown chemicals,” Kurt McComb told the Missoulian in May. “We’re being lied to.” The newspapers didn’t publish a list of the “dozens” of compounds.16
In 1996, the media never disclosed that the vast bulk, or 17,000 gallons, of cresylate spilled, or that the ruptured ends of the chlorine and cresylate tanker lay butted against each other, or what exactly was in potassium cresylate or a list of the specific compounds that were discovered.
*Migration of Chlorinated Compounds
After an investigation into residents’ reports of odors and symptoms during visits, officials determined that chlorinated compounds did not migrate from the site. The Missoulian reported the summary test results, but took little notice of the residents’ related complaints during the 17-day evacuation.
Just prior to reentry, the Missoulian reported Dawn Gonzalez’s mention of a fertilizer smell at her property. Then after reentry, on May 2, the Missoulian ran a feature on Randy Kryzsko’s decision not to return home, reporting on his smelling “weed-and-feed” in his Alberton home and how he and his son became ill during a recent visit.17 There were no further testimonies published about smells and symptoms upon residents returning home. The Missoulian showed no interest in pursuing the story. In fact, Gonzalez’s mention of an odor was incidental, and the focus of the Kryzsko story was his decision not to remain at home, not whether there was any health risk.
What was the official explanation to account for the discrepancy between what people smelled and the determination that nothing but chlorine had migrated offsite? How many people had complained of odors and symptoms? Where and when did they notice it? Did others abandon Alberton? These questions were never pursued by the media.
The story on the Kryzskos was the first and only semi-in-depth look at a returning family, and related claims of a white powder, a weed-and-feed smell and aggravated symptoms. But the story set off no alarms among health officials or the media. Presumably, health officials either didn’t believe the Kryzskos or didn’t believe their experience carried any public health significance. No local, state or national agency, nor the media, investigated to see if anyone else had a similar experience. On its face, the Kryzsko story lent credence to ACE’s concerns, and yet there was no follow up. Either officials and the media didn’t believe the Kryzskos, or no one cared. Or perhaps, absent investigation, an assumption was made that the Kryzskos must be somehow utterly unique.
*The Soil and Site
The Missoulian never questioned why the soil, which removal had been listed by UC as a criterion for reentry, was instead staged on site after reentry.
As reported in the Missoulian, just prior to the soil removal in mid-May, Ellen Leahy said area residents might notice the smell of the contaminated soil during removal, and “some that will smell it will be bothered by it, and others won’t be. It’s purely subjective, but real to those who smell it.”18
Leahy only made reference here to one unspecified substance in the potassium cresylate as being odorous—mercaptans, a sulfur smell. The implication was this was simply a matter of a powerful smell. There was no mention of the pesticide-like smell, which came from the phenolic compounds. Other than some people possibly being “bothered,” there was no warning of any health hazard, no mention of sensitivity.
On June 15, the Missoulian reported on the site clean up after soil removal. Tom Ellerhoff of the Montana DEQ reported “some chlorinated phenolic compounds remaining at the site,” but which posed “negligible risks.”19
On the back page, Ellerhoff acknowledged that “state and county health officials continue to receive periodic complaints about odors coming from the site. The skunk-like smell is caused by mercaptans….”
The report continued, “The chlorinated phenolic compounds created by the cresylate-chlorine mixture are also odorous. They smell like pesticides.” (Emphasis added.)
Nine weeks after the spill, this was the first published report of an official ascribing a pesticide odor to the spilled chemicals. But this news report made no connection between onsite smells and earlier evacuee reports of a pesticide-, fertilizer-, or weed-and-feed-like smell in areas even far from the site.
The report concluded, “People who are sensitive to the odors appear more apt to detect them than do others, Ellerhoff said…. The odor is not an indication of a health risk, according to Ellerhoff.” (Emphasis added.)
Referring only to ‘detection,’ Ellerhoff made no mention of any reported symptoms associated with complaints of ‘sensitivity’ to the odor, making it seem like nothing but an odor issue (and ignoring the Kryzskos’ story).
Officials had acknowledged that the site still smelled, that residual contamination remained, and that phenols smelled like pesticides, but they never acknowledged that residents away from the site were exposed to anything other than chlorine, despite complaints of a pesticide smell during the evacuation, during visits, after reentry and even after soil removal. The media didn’t investigate.
Regardless, the site was now deemed safe, though perhaps an odor issue for ‘sensitive’ people, with the caveat stripped of specific health symptoms. By the public record, there was no longer any health risk whatsoever from any residual contamination associated with the Alberton spill.
Yet Ellerhoff’s comments indirectly reinforced Randy Kryzsko’s reentry complaint of odors and symptoms, which had reinforced ACE’s complaints and concerns. Was this information about the site chemicals mere unrelated coincidence with ongoing odor and health complaints? The Missoulian didn’t pursue the issue.
*Long-term Health and Sensitivity
The Missoulian reported the general assurances from officials during the evacuation and after that there should be no long-term health problems for the vast majority of evacuees.
On Day 5, the Missoulian reported on Leahy’s concern, in responding to a victim’s complaint, that children might still have irritation from the chlorine gas and swimming in a chlorinated pool or hot tub might increase the irritation, or even initialize these symptoms. Leahy said such irritation would be temporary, fading with general recovery.90
On Day 6, the EPA’s Chris Weis elaborated for the Missoulian on Leahy’s comments about irritation from swimming pools, saying that “anyone exposed to the chlorine might become hypersensitive to it,” even just in returning to the area to feed livestock. “That hypersensitivity should go away within about eight weeks.”20 Again, this was publicized in reaction to people’s complaints and apparently unexpected. There was no report on the percentage of people that might experience this hypersensitivity or the specific symptoms.
On April 20th, when officials had begun testing to see if chlorinated compounds had migrated, the Missoulian reported generally on visiting residents complaining of “a pesticide-like smell…severe headaches, burning eyes and nausea.”21 Soon, officials determined no offsite migration of the chlorinated compounds. The newspaper didn’t inquire as to what caused the complaints if compounds hadn’t migrated and no chlorine was detected during visits.
On April 23, the Missoulian quoted Peter Nielsen of the health department that, concerning the contaminated soil that would be left on site after general reentry, “the chemicals are real odorous. They could cause discomfort for some of the people who already had the chlorine exposure and may be sensitive right now.”22 This was the first published word from an official that people might be sensitized to odors and chemicals other than chlorine, and this might cause ‘discomfort.’
By general reentry, concerns of any long-term health problems evaporated in the Missoulian, which quoted MRL President Brodsky claiming that even “those persons most seriously affected initially by the chlorine onset are getting better.”23 But Brodsky was referring to people hospitalized, not the prognosis for chronic illness.
The paper also reported on the May 3 meeting in Alberton that Drs. William Bekemeyer and Paul Loehnen held with about 300 Alberton-area residents to answer medical questions from the chlorine exposure. Their consensus was that “in the great majority of cases, people who have been exposed to chlorine gas will completely recover. Lung tissue will repair itself and lung function improves, usually within a matter of weeks.” Bekemeyer said that smokers and people with prior lung problems, like asthma and emphysema, might face more long-term problems, but chlorine “really doesn’t leave people with chronic problems,” he assured.24
Just the previous day, the Missoulian had run the Randy Kryzsko feature about his complaint of a weed-and feed smell at his home causing various symptoms, which drove him to quit his rental. Was this hypersensitivity? Were others experiencing this? There was no media investigation.
In late May, attorneys ran an advertisement in the Missoulian announcing upcoming medical testing from Dr. Kaye Kilburn of California. Seven weeks after the spill, clients still reported numerous ongoing symptoms:
“Coughing or breathing difficulties, headaches, sensitivity to smells and chemicals, eye or vision problems, dizziness, balance problems or vertigo, nausea, vomiting or diarrhea, throat, nasal or skin irritation, low energy or fatigue, stress reactions, including anxiety, depression, sleep problems, joint pains or inflammation, numbness or tingling in extremities, skin breakouts or rashes.”
People also claimed “permanent lung, immune, neurological or other physical injuries.”25 (Emphasis original.)
This was a significant array of symptoms, not only at odds with media-published medical information but many of these symptoms had gone unpublished as reported by victims, or unpublished as chronic problems to date. Who were these victims? Why did this list of ongoing complaints not even vaguely match what was reported in the newspapers? Was it lawyer hype? Was any of it connected to people returning to Alberton and experiencing new or aggravated symptoms?
There was no indication of a health official or media inquiry into these health complaints.
Then on May 29, the Missoulian’s Aulica Rutland reported on more residents claiming that returning to Alberton made them feel ill. Lucinda Hodges, spokesperson for ACE, said that after returning briefly to Alberton for an ACE meeting her “burning skin and eyes forced her out of town” back to her Missoula motel. She felt “allergic” to Alberton, she said.26 The unstated and uninvestigated implication: chemical sensitivity.
In June, Rutland’s feature on the 1991 Henderson, Nevada, chlorine release reported that one victim with a lawsuit had been diagnosed with chlorine-induced reactive airways dysfunction syndrome (RADS). This syndrome was not explained in the article, but it reverberated with Dr. Peschel’s earlier brief warning to evacuees about RADS possibly developing for those people with severe exposure, and attorney Zander Blewett’s earlier report about a man exposed to an undisclosed gas in the 1989 Helena, Montana, derailment. That man’s problems worsened over time and he “‘now has reactive airways disease,’” Blewett said. Seven years later, “‘his problems still aren’t over.’”27
Newsreaders might have asked, what exactly was RADS, and how did it relate to chlorine or other gas exposure? RADS lay at the heart of a controversy for victims of the Alberton spill, but the scant and scattered mention of this in the press relegated the issue to virtual insignificance, further marginalizing victims with sensitivity complaints.
Next came the publication of Ellerhoff’s June reference to residual chlorinated phenolic compounds at the site smelling like pesticides and his vague ‘detection’ reference concerning sensitivity reactions.
By July, the Missoulian declared “most people completely recovered; a few have lingering problems.”28 Based on the general context of published news reports over the past three months, a reader might reasonably assume the latter comment referred to those very few who had a severe exposure.
Subsequently, health issues related to the spill were forgotten in the media until the First Anniversary, except briefly in October when ACCEH publicized the visit of Linda King, and Lucinda Hodges reiterated to the Missoula Independent that people had chronic symptoms six months afterward, “ranging from joint pain, headaches and fatigue, to skin rashes, hair loss and ‘immune-type’ problems” in “disconcerting numbers” of people. ACCEH had assumed the mantle of publicizing chronic illness.29
“‘We’re saying to MRL that they were wrong to say there would be no long-term effects,’ Hodges said. She reported her group getting one to two calls per day since the derailment.”
But there was no media inquiry into these now long-term complaints, nor was there in 1997 when people protested loudly during the spring thaw and the resurgence of odors and symptoms in the Alberton area.
The lack of media inquiry mirrored the lack of inquiry by local and state health officials. Officially, people had only been exposed to chlorine and the vast majority of people had non-severe exposures and were assumed long recovered, despite the lack of tracking. Officially, no significant contamination remained in the area. Sensitivity issues, to the Alberton area or in general, were considered long resolved, or insignificant.
The Missoulian never ran a story on chemical sensitivity per se, or on how it might relate to the Alberton exposure. Ditto with RADS.
Much like the Sawmill Gulch reporting, but on a much more significant scale, the newspaper never took the initiative to connect the abundant dots of residents’ health complaints.
*Investigating Complaints
In their only editorial about the spill, the Missoulian praised MRL’s response, while noting “that some opportunists are taking advantage with lavish meals and questionable purchases.”30 This was the most specific allegation yet published concerning people taking advantage of MRL, and it came from the Missoulian editorial board. Out of all the complaints related to the spill, the editorial focused on the most trivial and least pertinent to public welfare. It also naively implied that MRL would not seek to recoup any unreasonable expenses in settling claims.
Later, post-spill reports noted fraud perpetrated by people claiming to have lived in Alberton and evacuated. In general, any serious claim abuse had little if anything to do with victims of the spill, but victims found themselves associated with it.
At the same time, the Missoulian made no comment on the complaints of ACE that residents weren’t getting full disclosure of information about what had spilled, long-term health effects, and the safety of going home. The conditions for reentry that ACE requested weren’t published in the paper until the day of reentry. ACE’s complaints no longer had any bearing for decision makers concerning the public safety of general reentry, and the media’s lack of investigation helped marginalize dissenters. ACE’s complaints became a matter of ‘personal choice’ of not returning home.
The allegation of abuse against MRL strongly upset many victims, who felt then and years later that the media unfairly focused on claims of abuse and greed while failing to report more fully on their concerns over disclosure, health effects and the safety of going home—the issues that mattered to them. Objectively, these abuse complaints were trivial compared with ongoing complaints of exposure and symptoms.
Later, the issue of long-term health complaints went mainly ignored by the media.
MRL’s Safety Record
Despite the 1996 Alberton mixed-chemical spill, the 1997 runaway train headed towards Missoula, and various other derailments during these years, the media’s investigation into MRL’s safety record and whether it had any bearing on these incidents was marginal.
Following the Alberton spill, the Missoulian published a hint of concern on April 14, 1996, when FRA Administrator Jolene Molitoris said that the FRA had met with MRL the previous year to discuss “potential safety improvements” concerning operation of the railroad.31
A week later, the Bozeman Chronicle dug a little into MRL’s safety record. Recent accidents, like Alberton, Noxon and a 31-car derailment in December (Bearmouth), were cause for concern. A 1995 FRA report had cited MRL for failure to “comply with a requirement to notify train crews of the location of cars containing hazardous materials.”32 The Missoulian never referred to the FRA report.
On April 28, an unidentified “source” to the Missoulian claimed that since the derailment “the speed limit on several sections of MRL track has been substantially decreased.… In some cases the speed limit has gone from 50-60 mph to less than 10 mph, because of track deficiencies.”23 This seemed significant news, but the newspaper didn’t dig into any alleged deficiencies, or look at any of the FRA reports critical of MRL operations.
During the Schliep case in 1998, U.S. District Judge Don Molloy sanctioned MRL for knowingly withholding from discovery roadmaster and track inspector documents about Curve 155 rail wear. The Missoulian belatedly ran the story a week after the order, their only coverage of the case.91
The Missoulian would never investigate allegations of deficient operations by MRL. Despite covering the EPA Ombudsman Alberton hearing, including reference to Le Schutter’s testimony, they made no mention of Schutter’s allegations of bad rail being reported prior to the derailment.21
The Missoulian took little notice of Alberton spill litigation files in general. Beyond rail safety, other examples included the vegetation bronzing map that documented the extent of visible tree damage from the cloud, signifying the extent of highest chlorine exposure, and Dr. Rick Neumeister’s case report on the prevalence of chronic eye damage.
As a net result of these perceived biases and omissions by the media, especially by the Missoulian, the main public published record, victims of the spill who had chronic health complaints, and those who dug into the public record of the response as well as the lawsuit documents, held the local media coverage generally in low esteem.
The media had told a story but not the story of the Alberton spill.
Perhaps the paramount lesson of the Alberton spill lies in recognizing that many spill victims were deeply unhappy with the overall response, and trying to understand why. Of course, they suffered chronic illness from their spill exposures, which would make anyone unhappy. But their unhappiness in the response was rooted in the way they were ultimately treated, in the way government agencies, the media, MRL and the community responded to their plight.
They felt they weren’t believed.
Imagine a traumatic event happening to you, perhaps the worst thing of your life—and no one believes you.
The evidence for this disbelief began with presumptions. People were told repeatedly, at public meetings and in the media, the general assurance that almost everyone had not had a serious enough exposure to result in permanent injury, that the vast majority of spill victims would fully recover. That was the general assurance from health officials and a few doctors. That was also the message absorbed by the various agencies involved, by the media, and by the greater community, including those not exposed.
Most everyone should be fine. That message set assumptions and expectations.
Evacuees who complained at public meetings and questioned assurances were told by other evacuees to shut up, while officials sought to limit and suppress open questions.22,85
Then came bad press. The first letter-to-the-editor published that addressed the spill, co-signed by seven Missoulians, commended MRL for their response while chastising certain victims. The vague letter said the incident had been a hardship and unfortunate, but “what is more unfortunate, though, is that some of the people who have been affected by this spill—and some people who have not—are acting with greed and self-indulgence.” The authors also expressed disgust with talk of lawsuits.41
“Give MRL a break – they have enough to deal with without greed, profit and self-indulgence added to the mess.”
By the time of general reentry, the Missoulian set the general tone with their only editorial regarding the spill, which praised MRL’s response, while publishing its rumor-like allegation of “reports that some opportunists are taking advantage with lavish meals and questionable purchases.”30 Neither this, nor any future Missoulian editorial, ever mentioned ongoing health problems and complaints of spill victims. During the 17-day evacuation, the paper made no investigation into residents’ complaints of smells and symptoms during visits, and paid scant attention after reentry.
Complaints by spill victims of becoming ill during visits couldn’t gain traction, but rumors of petty greed certainly did.
In early May 1996, when the Missoulian published its only semi-in-depth piece on an Alberton family’s return, the Kryzsko family reported headaches, throat constriction and vomiting upon reentering their rented home, and a pesticide smell.17 But the Missoulian made no further investigation despite the red flags that some residents were made physically ill returning to the Alberton area despite official assurances of safety.
The response by officials was telling. Publicly, there was no response.
The EPA’s Chris Weis recalled of the incident, “I don’t know. I mean, I was in many homes up there during the evacuation…. And I never experienced anything like that…. Now, that said, with the soil still down at the site and new railroad ties being brought it, I’m quite sure that there was creosote smell…. And to the extent that that creosote smell would bring back memories of the incident, traumatic memories of the incident, that’s a very viable explanation for a physiological response…. It’s a post-traumatic stress response.”43
Memories wasn’t a recognition of hypersensitivity.
Ellen Leahy recalled of the Kryzskos, “The whole family was having an experience—I felt kind of confused that other people were not having any experience or smelling anything and then it got to where the town was fighting with itself on whether or not it was good or bad to be back. At that point I had a hard time trying to figure out which to give more weight to.”
Leahy did “maybe just wonder why one whole family would have all the same symptoms and somebody living right next door wouldn’t. I’m not saying they didn’t have the symptoms. And I’m also not saying that people that said they couldn’t smell anything maybe couldn’t smell something. Because at that point the town began just fighting over what their reality was. And there were two different realities there.”44
Leahy didn’t outright say she didn’t believe the Kryzskos, but she didn’t say she did believe them. And she didn’t acknowledge that both realities could be true.
Leahy reemphasized, “It was interesting to me that I didn’t know anything about that particular family and that all four were having symptoms.” Leahy said the family never contacted her—but she never contacted the Kryzskos. Presumably, she also didn’t actually know the health status of the Kryzskos’ neighbors right next door.
Leahy, Weis and other health officials and doctors had privately discussed hypersensitivity prior to reentry. They acknowledged its symptoms, though they decided it couldn’t be a criterion for considering reentry. When an obvious example of hypersensitivity presented itself in the publicized experience of the Kryzskos, they publicly ignored it, and professionally as well. Less publicized, many others reported illness in returning home, but there were no inquiries. No one tracked or surveyed to determine the prevalence of sensitivity to returning, even though the public health consensus group had determined, Leahy had noted, that if a returning resident “becomes hyper – odor, go to physician. Proviso: a bunch of people with obvious rashes or PFT changes. Info – come back to all consensus groups.”45 If many people reported symptoms upon reentry, then the consensus groups would be reconvened.
But there was no process for tracking. Broad health issues were left to ATSDR—who would not report anything for years, and never tracked sensitivity.
During the 2015 staff ride, while imparting the lessons she wanted to pass off to participants, Leahy said of the post-reentry, “you demobilize and you go away. But these people are still sick. And they’re still worrying about their kids. And there’s still stuff (staged soil) sitting in the area that maybe is safe for them but….” But the health department’s role had ended. Leahy didn’t mention or characterize any ongoing resident complaints during this transition. But she did suggest the follow up to health complaints lay in the hands of ATSDR.46
A staff rider asked if the health department took over anything after the emergency was over?
“No. I continued to have people contact our department. Now, there were individual cases that went on and on and on and on forever. And I would get to a point with them where I would say, ‘I understand you continue to be dissatisfied. You’re in with a doctor. You are now at a point—I’ve given you all my public records, my information, my services. You are at a point now—you know, you’re just going to have to take it up with MRL.’ And of course, we knew those were going to go to suit anyhow.”
Leahy’s staff ride comments omitted that complaining residents suffered from hypersensitivity, including to contaminants left behind, and that many complained of debilitating symptoms making it impossible to return home, the source of their ‘dissatisfaction.’
Chris Cerquone, formerly of the Missoula health department, further revealed the perception among agencies close to the spill, framing the spill aftermath in the context of some debate over the seriousness of the exposures.
“I do think people were impacted by it. There was always sort of like, you know—‘Are people using this to take advantage of the—(railroad)?’ And I just don’t think so. If there was, it would maybe be some outliers. But for the most people, I think that people that had health effects, that truly had health effects—and it might have been the more sensitive population that maybe had the worst, meaning if they happened to be smokers, or happened to have some desensitization towards chlorine before that—that might have had the largest impacts…. I think in this case, overall, the truth lies closer to the people that were impacted than closer to the party saying there were no impacts. I think it was a significant event and a significant exposure to some individuals.”47
Through his many qualifiers, Cerquone seemed to imply that among the public, even the health department, there was some real questioning about the veracity of health complaints.
Meanwhile, in May 1996, Dr. Kaye Kilburn was getting nowhere soliciting help from government agencies for neurological testing of Alberton spill victims. At the conference call May 23 held by state public health director Todd Damrow with ATSDR officials, they referred to Kilburn disparagingly as an “expert witness” who was “representing fringe group who won’t go back into area,” referring elsewhere to ACE. “Missoula County wants physician to stand up to Kilburn and present his side,” presumably that chlorine was not a known neurotoxin. A further concern was that Bryony Schwan of Women’s Voices for the Earth or Dr. Rick Dart of the Rocky Mt. Poison Control Center “will legitimize Kilburn and the fringe group….”48
As opposed to supporting investigation of non-classic chlorine health symptoms possibly surfacing from the spill, these health officials concocted a strategy to publicly marginalize those complaints along with the ‘fringe’ holdouts.
Meanwhile, MT DEQ quietly responded to corporate complaints regarding smells and illness among workers, even advising worker relocation, without informing the public or giving similar advice to complaining residents.71-73
As the Missoulian reported authoritatively in July 1996, in putting the story to bed, a thing of the past: “most people completely recovered; a few have lingering problems.”40 The Missoulian—and the health department that informed them—had absolutely no idea whether most people had “completely recovered,” and yet showed no interest in investigating chronic illness, brushed aside as “lingering problems.”
The ‘few’ included those complainers who had interrupted evacuee meetings with persistent questions, who were actively censored and whom ultimately coalesced during the evacuation as ACE, later vilified by some as a disgruntled faction of radicals and hippies, not representative of the real Alberton. The fringe.
One year later, Missoulians were understandably surprised at the public protests during the first-year anniversary and spring thaw that triggered a resurgence of health complaints. But there was still no agency response or serious media investigation.
Wayne Wasser told Lisa Mosca that the Missoulian had withheld full reporting on spill victims. “This lady from the paper interviewed all kinds of people, and there was only two (Alberton area) families that she even talked about (Wasser and Stewart). Like she said to me—‘Half the people, I just didn’t believe their stories.’”Wasser implied that the reporter didn’t report interviews that she didn’t believe as true, and few of those.49
In an interview then, MRL president Bill Brodsky reported that with over 80% of claims settled, “‘I think we’re probably down to those cases that are more questionable at this point….’”50 Over 2000 claims were eventually filed, and 20% would translate into around 400 people.51 The Missoulian didn’t examine the numbers, which might have altered assumptions about how many people claimed chronic illness.
The Missoulian generally reassured that Alberton was ‘back to normal’ during its anniversary features, and never conducted a journalistic investigation into the various claims made by ACCEH members and many other residents, which mostly involved chronic illness.
The ATSDR Phase 2 health study publicized in late 1999 cautiously confirmed that many victims of the spill suffered chronic eye, skin and respiratory symptoms—and possibly other effects—18 months after the spill, as well as suggesting that two-thirds of the participants felt they had mild to significant chronic health symptoms in the fall of 1997.39
The Missoulian reported that some victims of the spill appeared to have “lingering health problems” from the exposure in citing ATSDR’s conclusions. The Missoulian hadn’t reported on any chronic effects of the spill since their anniversary report in 1997.52
Lucinda Hodges recalled when the latest health beat reporter for the Missoulian made initial contact after the ATSDR meeting, she told Hodges she had feared the mood of victims following the confirmation of chronic illness.42
“She was so happy that no one had been mean to her…. She seemed willing to cover the story…but she just seemed so uninformed.”
The small weekly Superior paper contacted the Chalmers after the ATSDR story, and Roger Chalmers told Hodges that the editor/reporter was reluctant to pick up the story after so long, fearing victims would be angry.
In litigation, of course, the fact that MRL generally disbelieved plaintiffs wasn’t surprising, as the lawyers were doing their paid job of defending their client. But for those people who weren’t just plaintiffs, but victims suffering chronic illness because of MRL’s toxic spill, the attacks on their credibility were no less painful.
In their 1996 health survey and 1997 health study follow up, ATSDR made no investigation into neurological symptoms, though they acknowledged such complaints, and no investigation into chemical sensitivity, even though ATSDR recognized it as an illness and had even developed a chemical sensitivity survey for mass exposures.
No local, state or national health agency did any investigation into the prevalence of chemical sensitivity of Alberton spill victims, symptoms which lay at the heart of their chronic complaints. And without such information via the media, the public never perceived any ongoing health problem.
Without this investigation, without this publicity, there was no chronic illness for public observers to believe in.
A close examination of the public record tells the full story. Listening to the victims informs a fuller understanding.
People reporting chronic illness were not believed. People saying returning home made them ill were not believed. Or, believers didn’t care. With no investigations taking place, such complainers were assumed to be a small and vocal minority—perhaps irrational, perhaps angling for lawsuits. Greedy. And easy to forget about.
What if there were a mass toxic exposure and no one believed it had any lasting consequence? You’re not missing a leg. You must be fine.
In more ways than one, your illness is invisible.
The denial even came from within, or within the same family. As more than one victim said, ‘I’m not a cry baby. This is Alberton.’ A town with so many people who had little idea how their neighbors were holding up.
The ‘few with lingering problems’ were survivors, their numbers uncounted, who endured years of physical and emotional and financial suffering, including the unremitting struggle to be believed.
The perseverance of those who refused to politely be poisoned was a testament to their strength and spirit, as was their relative equanimity. Beneath that surface, though, bubbled the toxin of frustration.
Think of Dixie Robertson’s contorted face and breaking voice, imploring a senator’s aide for help: “—do we have to dance on the tables?”69
Think of Beverly Ridenour pulling fistfuls of medications from her bag and slapping them on the aide’s table. “—this, this, and take these—and these, and these, and every night to take some again along with this! Nobody understands! I’ve never had to do that before!”
Think of Wayne Wasser at the ATSDR public meeting asking officials, “What happens with my child? He’s almost died twice! He stopped breathing…. And you’re worried about a health study! Why don’t you worry about helping the people in this community and help some of the people who are real sick?”68
Think of Larry Price: “There are people on this world that are walking that are lucky I don’t know the day I’m going to die, or to where my quality of life gets bad where I can’t move around, because I would exact an eye for an eye.”57
Think of Roger Chalmers, whose perceived physical threats against himself and Ada became an extension of his Alberton nightmare. “I wake up angry in the mornings when I think about it. It’s another day of waiting, and all the things that they’ve done. There’s times when I’d like to load a gun and go after them. Honestly. I won’t do that…. It’s probably real good I don’t live close to those people, because by now I would have gone over and beat the ever-loving-shit out of them.”40
Think of Lucinda Hodges and the years spent trying to get answers and help for her family’s chronic illness, and for so many others, and the brutal attack on her husband which she perceived to be a deadly warning.42
Think of being poisoned and suffering endless illness, emotional pain and financial stress. And no one believed you.
Who could blame them if they had gone off the rails and had really been impolite? That, if they’d had the breath, they had climbed up to the “A” above Alberton and screamed in rage.
A is for anger. Believe it.
And yet they persevered, they endured.
These are some of the lessons of the Alberton spill.
References
1-Missoula County 911 logs, April 11, 1996.
2-Emergency Response Guidebook 2008, US DOT.
3-Shirley Anderson, RL Scholl interview, 2001.
4-Questionnaire for people living in “restricted (hot) zone,” April 13, 1996. (Alberton Incident public document files, Missoula County)
5-Ginny Merriam, “Aftereffect of chlorine spill largely unknown,” Missoulian, 12 April 1996, B-1.
6-Sherry Jones, “Forced to Flee,” Missoulian, 12 April 1996, B-1.
7-Mick Holien, “Ill Wind: I-90 closed as 500 flee gas cloud,” Missoulian, 12 April 1996, A-1.
8-Mick Holien, “Cleanup ahead of schedule,” Missoulian, 16 April 1996, A-1.
9-Mick Holien, “Life slowly returning to normal after toxic chlorine spill,” Missoulian, 30 April 1996, A-1.
10-Sherry Devlin, “UM chemist looks for other toxins resulting from spill,” Missoulian, 19 April 1996.
11-Ginny Merriam, “Hazards routinely ride rails,” Missoulian, 12 April 1996, B-1.
12-Mick Holien, “Two weeks more” Missoulian, 13 April 1996, A-1.
13-MSDS for potassium cresylate, April 11, 1996. (EPA Alberton Superfund Site file)
14-Aulica Rutland, “Derailment workers applauded,” Missoulian, 18 April 1996, A-10.
15-Sherry Devlin, “New fears in Alberton,” Missoulian, 20 April 1996, A-1.
16-Aulica Rutland, “‘We’re not gonna quit:’ Irked Alberton residents enlist aid of Love Canal warrior,” Missoulian, 7 May 1996, B-1.
17-Aulica Rutland, “Concerned about lingering toxins, Alberton family decides to move on,” Missoulian, 2 May 1996, A-1.
18-Mick Holien, “Contaminated soil being shipped to Texas,” Missoulian, 14 May 1996, A-1.
19-Sherry Devlin, “Chemicals linger at Alberton site: health risk is low, say officials,” Missoulian, 15 June 1996, B-1.
20-Aulica Rutland, “Next step: getting rid of chlorine in ‘Tank 3,’” Missoulian, 17 April 1996, A-1.
21-Ginny Merriam, “Alberton spill victims want action on illnesses,” Missoulian, 12 November 2000.
22-Sherry Devlin, “Tests show spilled toxic chemicals stayed put,” Missoulian, 23 April 1996, B-1.
23-Mick Holien, “Home at last: a few still have to wait; I-90 only open to local traffic,” Missoulian, 28 April 1996, A-1.
24-Aulica Rutland, “Doctors: Most will fully recover from chlorine exposure,” Missoulian, 3 May 1996, A-1.
25-Advertisement by the law offices of William Rossbach of Missoula and Mark Mueller, “Medical and legal help for Alberton area chlorine spill victims,” Missoulian, 26 May 1996, B-7.
26-Aulica Rutland, “Homesick: returning to town, some residents say they are still feeling the effects of the spill,” Missoulian, 29 May 1996, B-6.
27-Sherry Devlin, “Alberton man sues Rail Link,” Missoulian, 17 April 1996, A-7.
28-Mea Andrews, “Railroad Days put past, future of town on track,” Missoulian, 21 July 1996, B-1.
29-Dan Nailen, “Alberton coalition helps chlorine victims,” Missoula Independent, 24October 1996.
30-Unsigned editorial, “Give Montana Rail Link Its Due,” Missoulian, 28 April 1996, A-4.
31-Jim Ludwick, “Zero Tolerance: Federal railroad chief puts public’s safety first,” Missoulian, 14 April 1996, B-1.
32-Joan Haines,“Alberton accident serves as a warning,” Bozeman Chronicle, 21 April 1996.
33-E. Dunning and Jennifer L. Oswalt, “Train Wreck and Chlorine Spill in Graniteville, South Carolina: Transportation Effects and Lessons in Small-Town Capacity for No-Notice Evacuation,” Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 2009, pp130-135.
34-Dave Richardson and Wayne A. Hall, “On track for trouble,” Times Herald-Record, 19 June 2005.
35-Scott Waldron, RL Scholl interview, 2013.
36-Jess Mickelson, RL Scholl interview, 2011.
37-Dale Golden, RL Scholl interview, 2011.
38-Marine Field Notebook, April 22, 1996. (Found in field by Mark Hanson)
39-Evaluation of Residual Respiratory and Other Health Effects from a Chlorine Release, Draft of the ATSDR Phase 2 Alberton study for Public Comments, December 1, 1999.
40-Ada and Roger Chalmers, RL Scholl interviews, 1999-2000.
41-Michelle Melton and 6 co-signers, “Give MRL a break,” Missoulian letter-to-the-editor, 24 April 1996.
42-Lucinda Hodges, RL Scholl interviews, 1999-2002.
43-Chris Weis, RL Scholl interview, 2011.
44-Ellen Leahy, RL Scholl interview, 2009.
45-Ellen Leahy’s Notes, April 21, 1996. (Alberton Incident public document files, Missoula County)
46-Alberton Train Derailment Staff Ride, May 2, 2015, Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation. (RL Scholl video recording)
47-Chris Cerquone, RL Scholl interview, 2009.
48-MT DPHHS notes from May 23, 1996, on conference call with ATSDR. (MT DPHHS Alberton file)
49-Wayne Wasser, Lisa Mosca interview, 1998.
50-Mick Holien, “Brodsky: MRL has learned from spill,” Missoulian, 8 April 1997, A-1.
51-No author, “Winning 2002: The art of the win,” National Law Journal, 10 June 2002.
52-Ginny Merriam, “Lingering health problems linked to chlorine spill,” Missoulian, 8 December 1999, B-1.
53-MRL West Dispatchers tapes, April 11, 1996. (NTSB Alberton file)
54-MRFD Hazmat Communication Dispatch log, April 11, 1996. (Alberton Incident public document files, Missoula County)
55-Pat Walsh affidavit, in Patrick and Linda Walsh vs. MRL (DV-99-87922) (Montana Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County) (#29).
56-Tom Zeigler, RL Scholl interview, 2009, 2010.
57-Larry Price, RL Scholl interview, 2002.
58-Willis Hintz, RL Scholl interview, 2010.
59-Tom Zeigler recon video, April 11-12, 1996.
60-Tien Nguyen, RL Scholl interview, 2002.
61-Mineral County Sheriff’s log, April 14, 1996. (Alberton Incident public document files, Missoula County)
62-John Fidler log, April 12, 1996. (Alberton Incident public document files, Missoula County)
63-MRFD Hazmat Communication Dispatch log, April 16, 1996. (Alberton Incident public document files, Missoula County)
64-Ellen Leahy’s notes, April 23, 1996. (Alberton Incident public document files, Missoula County)
65-Alberton Incident Command Summary Log, 7:00 pm, April 23, 1996. (Alberton Incident public document files, Missoula County)
66-“The Alberton Canyon Incident Home Re-entry Plan,” April 14, 1996. (Alberton Incident public document files, Missoula County)
67-MRL Evacuee Meeting handout, April 17, 1996. (Alberton Incident public document files, Missoula County)
68-ATSDR public meeting in Alberton, Montana, September 1997, Lisa Mosca video recording.
69-Meeting of Lucinda Hodges, Beverly Ridenour and Dixie Robertson with Kjersten Forseth, aide to Sen. Max Baucus, Missoula office, August 28, 1999, RL Scholl audio recording.
70-Alberton Incident Command Meeting log, 4:40 pm, April 21, 1996. (Alberton Incident public document files, Missoula County)
71-Letter from Tom Ellerhoff, MT DEQ, to Dale Kerkvliet, Plum Creek Lumber Co., May 9, 1996. (MT DEQ Alberton site file)
72-Letter from Tom Ellerhoff, MT DEQ, to Judy Stang, Mineral County Commissioner, October 17, 1996. (MT DEQ Alberton site file)
73-Tom Ellerhoff notes, MT DEQ, November 1996. (MT DEQ Alberton site file)
74-Dr. Rick Neumeister deposition, October 12, 1999, in Mayo et al v. MRL (CV-98-109-M-DWM) (US District Court, District of Montana, Missoula Division) (#180).
75-Dr. Cynthia Lewis-Younger, “Alberton medical intervention summary—draft,” Rocky Mountain Center for Occupational and Environmental Health, April 14, 2000.
76-Dr. Kaye Kilburn, “Persisting neurobehavioral and pulmonary impairment 7 weeks and 39 months after a chlorine exposure,” U.S.C. School of Medicine, September 16, 1999.
77-Lisa Mosca, A Toxic Train Ran Through It: a story of who benefits and who loses in toxic chemical catastrophes, (video), University of Montana Graduate Thesis in Environmental Studies, 1999. (University of Montana Mansfield Library)
78-Hope Sieck, Toxic trains: an analysis of disclosure in the April 11, 1996 Montana Rail Link derailment and mixed chemical spill at Alberton, Montana, and recommendations for improving the community right-to-know, University of Montana Graduate Thesis in Environmental Studies, 2001. (University of Montana Mansfield Library)
79-Maarten Schreuder, “Acute and long-term effects of chlorine gas exposure on public health and the natural ecosystem after a train derailment in Alberton MT, 11 April 1996,” Environmental Impact Assessment, graduate student, Department of Biological Sciences, University of Montana, 1998.
80-Montana Dept. of Military Affairs, Disaster and Emergency Services, April 11, 1996. (MT DEQ files)
81-Chemical Infogram: “Chlorine gas,” Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety, 1989.
82-Len Iwanski, “Poisonous gas hovers in Big Sky,” AP News in Great Falls Tribune, 12 April 1996, A-1.
83-Aulica Rutland, “Quick response” Missoulian, 19 April 1996, A-1.
84-Aulica Rutland, “It’s eerie around Alberton these days,” Missoulian, 15 April 1996, A-7.
85-Alberton Evacuee Meeting, April 22, 1996, Will Snodgrass video recording.
86-“The Effects of the Alberton Derailment on Forested Communities: An Analysis of Aerial Photography,” Bitterroot Consultants, Corvallis, Montana, July 1, 1997.
87-Aulica Rutland, “Father worries about kids living in the ‘warm zone,’” Missoulian, 15 April 1996, A-7.
88-MRFD IO log, April 11, 1996. (Alberton Incident public document files, Missoula County)
89-Aulica Rutland and Mick Holien, “Evacuated families staying put,” Missoulian, 15 April 1996, A-1.
90-Sherry Devlin, “Many evacuees breathe easier, doctor reports,” Missoulian, 16 April 1996, B-1. (with Clarification, April 17, 1996)
91-Michael Moore, “Judges Raps MRL for Hiding Memo,” Missoulian, 20 April 1998, A-1.
